論文頁數: 55 關鍵字: 魁普奇 Kripke the Fregean the Millian belief attribution puzzle sense reference [摘要] 　　薩爾‧魁普奇 (Saul Kripke) 乃直指理論 (the theory of direct reference) 的建立者之一，他在這方面的頁獻所受到的注意多放在他的《稱名與必然性》(Naming and Necessity) 與 〈同一性與必然性〉('Identity and Necessity')上，而他的另外一篇論文〈一個關乎信念的迷困〉('A Puzzle about Belief') 在相關議題的討論中，卻鮮少受到正視。前者所發展出的論點，我稱之為正面論點 (the Positive Thesis)；後者所蘊涵的論點，我稱之為反面論點 (the Negative Thesis)。本文即是以魁普奇這篇文章為出發點，並以反面論點為核心，所作的一連串的討論與分析。 　　首先，我將引述及建構與本文內容相關之基本概念， 且期望透過對魁普奇信念迷困的論證的檢討，指出其中所蘊涵的一個對弗雷格觀點 (the Fregean view) 的挑戰，並對弗電格主義者可能提出的解釋與回應作一探討。如果弗雷格式的意義(Sinn; sense)概念不足以解魁普奇之迷，則弗雷格觀點將受到相當的質疑。其次，我擬以薩門 (N. Salmon) 與克瓦特 (I. Kvart) 的論證，進一步探討二者對魁普奇迷困提出了何種解決，以討論其是否成功。如果這個迷困仍然無解(without solution)或無法被解消(without resolution)，則表示魁普奇所言「該迷困是個不折不扣的迷困或詭論(paradox)」再次得到證實；反之 ，如果它被解決，是否意味著弗雷格觀點將不再受到魁普奇反面論點的威脅？ 　　在魁普奇的建構下，弗雷格迷困(Frege's Puzzle)與魁普奇迷困二者間不論在其所假定原則(the principles assumed)、論證形式(argument form)與結論上，都有著平行般的相似關係。因此，魁普奇迷困一旦被解決，弗雷格迷困也將面臨被解消的危機。如此一來，弗雷格式的意義概念在魁普奇反面論點下所受到的挑戰與質疑，似乎更為明確了。 [摘要] 　　Saul Kripke is one of several contemporary philosophers who establish the theory of direct reference. His contribution to the subject has mainly been owed to the theses presented in NAMING and NECESSITY and a related paper ' Identity and Necessity'. But it is often ignored that some related issues, especially the challenge and refutation to the Fregean view, could also be found in his 'A Puzzle about Belief'. In this master thesis, the issues arising from it are clarified and examined. 　　Chapter 1 concisely introduces the Fregean view and the position Kripke holds (the Millian view). In addition, I make a distinction between the Positive Thesis and the Negative Thesis, and divide Kripke's critiques of the Fregean notion of sense into these two parts. The Negative Thesis, on my view, is one of consequences arising from Kripke's arguments for belief puzzle. It poses a challenge, in an implicit way, to the Fregean view. 　　Chapter 2 is centred on the problems stemming from Kripke's belief puzzle, on demonstrating the arguments for this puzzle, examining the principles assumed and the postulate presupposed, and clarifying the challenge posed to the Fregean view. In this chapter, I elaborate the Negative Thesis and argue that Kripke's arguments does pose a challenge to the notion of Fregean sense. (The absent section concerning the notion of Fregean sense is forthcoming.) 　　In chapter 3 and chapter 4, our focus changes from the puzzle to its resolutions. Nathan Salmon's and Igal Kvart's resolutions are discussed respectively. In addition to reconstruction, I also try to examine these arguments and consider their implications with respect to the Negative Thesis. 　　This master thesis ends, in chapter 5, with a conclusion. Here we reconsider the issues discussed in the previous chapters, and draw some results from them. The result of chapter 2 taken together with those of chapters 3-4 will be seen as upporting the contention that Kripke's Puzzle is resolvable, but while the Negative Thesis is said to be unsound, Frege's Puzzle vanishes. [論文目次] 1 INTRODUCTION 1 Preliminaries. The Fregean View. The Positive Thesis and the Negative Thesis. The Menu. Notes. 2 A BELIEF PUZZLE 7 Introduction. The Puzzle. Any Way Out? From Kripke's Puzzle to Frege's Puzzle. Comparing the Puzzles. The Principles Reconsidered. Conclluding Remarks. Notes. 3 SALMON'S RESOLUTION 21 Introduction. The Single Language Case. Some of Salmon's Main Theses. Analysis of Belief. The Resolution. The Proofs. A Fregean Objection: The Double Shot. Notes. 4 KVART'S RESOLUTION 39 Introduction. Beliefs. Belief Sentences. The Resolution. The Inconsistency Problem. The Contradiction Problem. Notes. 5 CONCLUSION 47 Fregean Sense and Kripke's Puzzle. Resolutions, the Negative Thesis, and the Fregean View. BIBLIOGRAPHY 49 INDEX OF LABELED EXPRESSIONS 53 [參考文獻] BRANQUINHO, J. 1990. "Are Salmon's 'Guises' Disguised Fregean Senses?" Analysis 50(1): 19-24. BURGE, T. 1977. "Belief De Re." The Journal of Philosophy 74 (June): 338-362. DONNELLAN, K. S. 1972. "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions." In D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), pp. 356- 379. FORBES, G. 1987. "A Book Review of Frege's Puzzle." Philosophical Review 96: 455- 458. FREGE, G. 1892. "On Sense and Reference." In Frege, 1952, pp. 56-78. Also in Moore, 1993, pp. 23-42; all page references given in this work are to the book. 1918. "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry." A. 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