The Distinction between Causation and Invariance and Its Implications for the Philosophical Discuss
Abstract
Recently, certain philosophers have argued that an explanatory relation is a causal relation that is fundamentally about the invariance of a relation between variables of interest under intervention-i.e., about a manipulable invariant relation. This manipulative theory tends to reduce a causal relation to a manipulable invariant relation. By explicating a case from contemporary econometrics, this paper argues that a manipulable invariant relation can be obtained only when the causal chain or causal structure ofthe targeted relation is free from disturbing influences. In other words, a manipulable invariant relation can be regarded only as a special kind of causal relation, and so the notion of invariance can never replace the idea of causation. This paper also shows that the distinction between causation and invariance has methodological import conceming the philosophical discussion of economic theorizing and of economic theory development.
作者姓名:
Szu-Ting Chen
期刊名稱:
《國立臺灣大學哲學論評》
出版年份:
2003年
期別及起訖頁數:
第26期，頁51-90
文章分類:
期刊論文
The Distinction between Causation and Invariance.pdf