職　　稱：Assistant Professor 助理教授

專長領域 : Ethics, Meta-ethics, Philosophy of Action, Rationality, Normativity

倫理學、後設倫理學、行動哲學、理性、規範性

學　　歷 :

2015-2020 DPhil in Philosophy, Balliol College, University of Oxford

牛津大學哲學系哲學博士 

2013-2015 BPhil in Philosophy, The Queen's College, University of Oxford

牛津大學哲學系哲學碩士 

2006-2011 Bachelor of Laws in Law and Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, National Taiwan University

國立臺灣大學法律學系法學學士與哲學系文學學士 

電子郵件 :  jay.s.jian@gmail.com

期刊論文 :

1. “Misinformation, Subjectivism, and the Rational Criticizability of Desire,” 
Philosophical Studies (2021) 178(3): 845-66.
2. “Rational Norms for Degreed Intention (and the Discrepancy between Theoretical and Practical Reason),"
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).

會議發表 :
1. “A Constitutivist Account of Reasons Transmission”
      05/2022  Workshop on Reasons, Ought, and Normative Transmission, Humboldt University (scheduled)
2. “A New Pragmatic Argument for Sticking with Commitments”
      09/2021  Conference on Preferences, Commitments and Choice, University of Zurich 
3. “Some Problems with Comparative Valuing”
      01/2022  2022 Eastern Division Meeting (Colloquium), American Philosophical Association (scheduled)
      08/2021  The 14th Annual Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado 
      07/2021  The 95th Joint Session, Aristotelian Society & the Mind Association
      04/2021  Faculty Colloquium, National Chung Cheng University (invited)
4. “The Internalist Connection between Intention and All-Things-Considered Judgment”
      02/2021  2021 Central Division Meeting (Colloquium), American Philosophical Association 
5. ”Re-motivating the Internalist Constraint”
      11/2020  Workshop on Metaethics and Metaepistemology, University of Vienna  
6. “Do We Have a Reason to Do What We Desire to Do?”
      11/2020  Faculty Colloquium, Soochow University (invited)
7. “Value and Reason in the Face of Misinformation”
      08/2020  Faculty Colloquium, National Tsing Hua University (invited)
8. “In Defense of the Executive Conception of Instrumental Rationality” 
      03/2020  Slippery Slope Normativity Summit, Inland Norway University
      07/2019  The 5th Annual Southern Normativity Group Conference, Cardiff University
9. “Why Intention Presupposes Mental Unity” 
      10/2019  Action and Ethics: How, Why, Ought, University of Utah 
      08/2019  New Horizons in Action and Agency, University of Helsinki 
10. “An Analysis of the Structure of Instrumental Irrationality and Executive Vice” 
      07/2019  The 93rd Joint Session, Aristotelian Society & the Mind Association, University of Durham
      03/2019  Tennessee Value and Agency Conference, University of Tennessee
11. “Subjectivism and Two Kinds of Authenticity” 
      12/2018  Lake Geneva Graduate Conference, University of Neuchâtel
12. “The Rational Irrelevance of Desire Strength” 
      11/2018  Ockham Society, University of Oxford 
13. “Misinformed Desire and the Foundations of Subjectivism” 
      03/2018  Connecticut Graduate Conference in Philosophy, University of Connecticut
      04/2017  Stockholm Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Stockholm
14. “Davidson’s Constitutivist Picture of Practical Rationality” 
      11/2017  Workshop on Donald Davidson's Philosophy, National Taiwan University
15. “Agency, Instrumental Rationality, and the Hierarchy of Desires”
      09/2017  Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, University of Salzburg
16. “How Can Ends Be Rationally Criticized under Instrumental Rationality?” 
      02/2017  DPhil Seminar, University of Oxford 
17. “Instrumental Rationality and the Cognitive Grounding of Desire”
      01/2017  Ockham Society, University of Oxford 
18. “Two Constraints on Subjectivist Theories of Normative Reason”
      07/2016  The 5th Understanding Value Conference, University of Sheffield
19. “Moral Motivation, Goal, and Background Beliefs” 
      06/2014  Ockham Society, University of Oxford